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Abstract
Some contemporary views of the universe assume information and
computation to be key in understanding and explaining the basic
structure underpinning physical reality. We introduce the Computable
Universe exploring some of the basic arguments giving foundation to
these visions. We will focus on the algorithmic and quantum aspects,
and how these may fit and support the computable universe hypoth-
esis.
1 Understanding Computation & Exploring
Nature As Computation
Since the days of Newton and Leibniz, scientists have been constructing elab-
orate views of the world. In the past century, quantum mechanics revolu-
tionised our understanding of physical reality at atomic scales, while general
relativity did the same for our understanding of reality at large scales.
Some contemporary world views approach objects and physical laws in
terms of information and computation [25], to which they assign ultimate
responsibility for the complexity in our world, including responsibility for
complex mechanisms and phenomena such as life. In this view, the universe
∗Based in the introduction to A Computable Universe, published by World
Scientific Publishing Company and the Imperial College Press, 2012. See
http://www.mathrix.org/experimentalAIT/ComputationNature.htm
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and the things in it are seen as computing themselves. Our computers do no
more than re-program a part of the universe to make it compute what we
want it to compute.
Some authors have extended the definition of computation to physical
objects and physical processes at different levels of physical reality, ranging
from the digital to the quantum. Most of the leading thinkers involved in
this effort are contributors to A Computable Universe [26], including some
who oppose the (digital) approach, preferring to advance their own.
The computational/informational view (sometimes identified as compu-
tationalism) is rooted in pioneering thinking by authors such as John A.
Wheeler and Richard Feynman. A quotation from Feynman’s Messenger
Lectures, delivered at Cornell University in 1964, distills his sense that na-
ture most likely operates at a very simple level, despite seeming complex to
us, and marks a shift to understanding physics in terms of digital information.
It always bothers me that, according to the laws as we un-
derstand them today, it takes a computing machine an infinite
number of logical operations to figure out what goes on in no
matter how tiny a region of space, and no matter how tiny a
region of time ... So I have often made the hypothesis that ulti-
mately physics will not require a mathematical statement, that
in the end the machinery will be revealed, and the laws will turn
out to be simple, like the chequerboard with all its apparent com-
plexities.
His view was probably influenced by his thesis advisor John A. Wheeler,
the coiner of the phrase “it from bit”, suggesting that information consti-
tutes the most fundamental level of physical reality [18]. Another pioneer
was Konrad Zuse, a new edition of whose Calculating Space (Rechnender
Raum) we are pleased to be able to publish in A Computable Universe [26].
We’ve put great effort into translating into modern LATEX the scanned ver-
sion of the original translation commissioned by Ed Fredkin and published
by MIT. Fredkin is himself another pioneer, having founded the field that is
today known as digital physics, and is a contributor to A Computable Uni-
verse [26]. Stephen Wolfram, a student of Feynman, has also been building
upon this view, spearheading a paradigm shift facilitated by today’s availabil-
ity of increasingly greater and cheaper computational resources. Even more
recently, some modern theories of physics under development have been at-
tempting to unify quantum mechanics and general relativity on the basis of
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information (’t Hooft, Susskind, Smolin), a development represented in the
work of some contributors to A Computable Universe [26].
These contemporary views of a computational universe are also deeply re-
lated, via the concept of information, to a contemporary field of mathematical
research called algorithmic information theory (AIT). AIT researchers think
that the true nature of nature can only be unveiled by studying the notion
of randomness (Greg Chaitin, Leonid Levin, Cris Calude). A few papers are
devoted to this topic, including two from Chaitin and Calude 1.
1.1 What is computation? How does nature compute?
Zuse suggested early on that the world was possibly the result of deterministic
digital computation, in particular a cellular automaton. Ed Fredkin would
later develop the idea further (see his contribution to A Computable Universe
[26]). In his minimalistic approach, Wolfram argues that the world may turn
out to be the result of very simple rules, perhaps even a single one, from
which the apparent complexity we see around us emerges. If the universe is
a computable one, we could just run a universal Turing computer on every
possible program to generate not only our own universe but every possible
one, as Wolfram and Schmidhuber have suggested (both are contributors to A
Computable Universe [26]). The question would then be how to distinguish
our universe from any other. Wolfram has pointed out that there will be
some universes that are obviously different from ours, and many others that
may look very similar, in which case we can ask whether ours will turn out
to be special or uncommon in any sense, whether, for example, it would rank
among the first in terms of description size, i.e. be among those having the
shortest description. If it is simple enough, AIT would then suggest that it
is also frequent, the result of many programs generating the same universe.
This is a conclusion based on algorithmic probability, which describes the
distribution of patterns, and establishes a strong connection to algorithmic
complexity.
According to Schmidhuber’s approach, it would seem that a computer
generating every possible universe would necessarily have to be several times
larger than the universe itself. But if the programs are short enough, instead
of running every program a step at a time, beginning with the smallest and
1Where author names are provided without a reference, the authors in question are
contributors to A Computable Universe [26].
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proceeding in increasing order of size, it may be possible to start with some
plausible universes and run them for longer times, as Wolfram has suggested,
checking each program and allowing those that are apparently complex to
unfold (and eventually leading to the physical properties of our universe).
There are also those who believe that nature not only performs digital
computation (as is the view of Zuse, Fredkin or Wolfram, all contributors to
A Computable Universe [26]), but is itself the result of quantum computation
(Lloyd, Deutsch and Cabello, also authors of chapters in A Computable Uni-
verse [26]). According to them, the world would in the last instance be rooted
in physics, particularly quantum mechanics, and would reflect the properties
of elementary particles and fundamental forces. Lloyd, for example, asks
how many bits there are in the universe, offering an interesting calculation
according to which, given the properties of quantum particles, the universe
cannot be rendered in a description shorter than itself–simply because every
elementary particle would need to be simulated by another elementary parti-
cle. A computer to simulate the universe would therefore need to be the size
of the universe, and would require the energy of the actual universe, hence
making it undistinguishable from a (quantum) computer, the computer and
the computed being in perfect correspondence.
If the goal is not to describe with the greatest accuracy our universe in the
state it is in, one may ask whether a universe of similar complexity would
require a very complicated description. The discussion seems therefore to
revolve around the possible description of the universe, whether it can be
written in bits or in qubits, whether it can be shorter than the universe or
not. If digital information underlies the quantum, however, it may turn out
that the shortest description of the universe would be much shorter than the
universe itself, contrary to the views of, for example, Lloyd, Deutsch, Cabello
or Calude et al., and could then be compressed into a simple short computer
program, as Zuse, Wolfram, Fredkin, Bolognesi and I myself believe.
In fact, one can think of the goal of digital physics as a minimal model
describing the universe, equivalent to the goal of physics in its quest for a
unified theory, a descriptive formula governing all forces and particles yet to
be discovered, if any such remain. Whether such a program exists is an open
question, just as it is an open question whether there is a theory of every-
thing (ToE). But it is no longer an open question whether such unification
can be achieved for very large portions of physics. It is a fait accompli in
fields such as gravitation and movement, electricity and magnetism, electro-
magnetism and most electronuclear forces, areas of physics that today model
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with frightening accuracy large portions of nature using simple laws than
can be programmed in a computer and can in principle (and often de facto)
provide perfect prescriptions and predictions about the world. In fact we
have physical laws and computer programs for pretty much everything; what
we lack is a single theory that encompasses all other theories.
2 The algorithmic approach
If the world is in fact not a digital computer, it could nevertheless behave like
one. Thus whether or not it is a digital computer, one could test whether
the output of processes in the world resembles the output that one would
expect from running a program. There are many laws that computers may
follow. Or if you prefer, they follow a specific subset of physical laws related
to information processing, notably the distribution of patterns described by
algorithmic probability.
From my point of view, information can only exist in our world if it is
carried by a process; every bit has to have a corresponding physical carrier.
Even though this carrier is not matter, it takes the form of an interaction
between components of matter–an atom interacting with another atom, or
a particle interacting with another particle. At the lowest level, however,
the most elementary particles, just like single bits, carry no information (the
Shannon entropy of a single bit is 0 because one cannot implement a commu-
nication channel of 1 bit only, 1 and 0 having the same possible information
content if taken in isolation). Isolated particles may have no causal history,
being memoryless when isolated from external interaction. When particles
interact with other particles they appear to be linking themselves to a causal
network and seem to be forced to define a value as a result of this interac-
tion (e.g. a measurement). What surprises us about the quantum world is
precisely its lack of apparent causality, which we see everywhere else and are
so used to. But it is the interaction and its causal history that carries all the
memory of the system, with the new bit appearing as if it had been defined
at random because our theories of quantum mechanics only provide proba-
bility amplitudes. Linking a bit to the causal network may seem tantamount
to producing a correlation of measurements between seemingly disconnected
parts of space, while in fact they may have always already been connected,
if the world were taken as deterministic (a view implicit in so-called hidden
variables models).
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Levin’s universal distribution [12] based on algorithmic probability de-
scribes expected output frequencies in relation to their complexity. A pro-
cess that produces a string s with a program p when executed on a universal
Turing machine T has probability PrT (s) = 2
−|p| where |p| is the length of
the program p.
The coding theorem [8, 7] connects the frequency Pr(s) with which a
string s is produced to its algorithmic complexity C(s). The so-called semi-
measure m has also the remarkable property of dominating PrT for any uni-
versal Turing machine T . Roughly speaking, m(s) establishes that if there
are many long descriptions of a certain string, then there is also a short de-
scription with low algorithmic complexity C(s), that is m(s) ≈ 2−C(s). As
neither C(s) nor m(s) is computable, no program can exist which takes a
string s as input and produces m(s) as output. However, we have proven
[10] that numerical approximations are possible and that reasonable numer-
ical evaluations produce reasonable results. Just as strings can be produced
by programs, we may ask after the probability of a certain outcome from
a certain natural phenomenon, if the phenomenon, just like a computing
machine, is a process rather than a random event. If no other information
about the phenomenon is assumed, we can see whether m(s) says anything
about a distribution of possible outcomes in the real world [22]. In a world
of computable processes, m(s) would indicate the probability that a natural
phenomenon produces a particular outcome and tell us how often a certain
pattern would occur.
Consider an unknown operation generating a binary string of length k
bits. If the method is uniformly random, the probability of finding a par-
ticular string s is exactly 2−k, the same as for any other string of length
k, which is equivalent to the chances of picking the digits of pi at random.
However, data (just like pi–largely present in nature, for example, in the form
of common processes relating to curves) are usually produced not at random
but by a specific process (in the case of pi there are many ways to produce
it; there are even physical phenomena that lead to it). This is where m(s)
may be relevant to calculating the probability of physical processes.
2.1 Information and structure in living organisms
Biology has witnessed a transformation during the last century, beginning
with Mendel’s discoveries regarding the transfer of certain traits in pea plants,
a phenomenon amounting to an information transfer between generations.
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Later rediscovered, his laws would lay the foundation for what is today the
modern science of genetics, which has established that living organisms store
and bequeath information comprising instructions for their full development
encoded–as Watson and Crick discovered–in ribonucleic and nucleic acids.
The code of life is digital; two bits per base pair are needed to encode the
DNA.
Rules determining the way DNA replicates may be algorithmic in nature,
like those governing other types of physical phenomena, leading us to some-
times discover strong similarities in their pattern distribution. Processes of
DNA are relatively simple. A subset of purely digital operations can match
their operations with computational ones, operations such as joining, copy-
ing, partitioning, complementation, trimming, or replacing. Which implies
that layer upon layer of the code of life has been built up over billions of
years in a deep algorithmic process with its own characteristic rules, making
processes like protein folding appear highly complex to us. If we ignore the
algorithm of protein folding, there is no reason to think that protein folding
cannot be carried out by a (deterministic) machine (whether in polynomial
time or not).
In the case of structures whose final state is certain (whether a folded
protein or the division of a cell), the solution is either the result of an algo-
rithm or of a random process. It is unlikely that protein folding is random
because an incorrectly folded protein would obviously cause disease. One of
the most important properties of life is robustness, which we think may be
explained by algorithmic probability [24].
If computation is the driving force producing structure in the world, one
can use it as a basis for manipulating the direction of complexity. Think of the
problem of putting together the right chemical elements for life. If we expect
life to emerge out of chemicals, expecting them to produce, say, the digits of
the mathematical constant pi, the chances of this happening are ridiculously
low. How has nature produced organisms of such complexity? Wolfram, for
example, thinks that nature mines what he calls the computational universe
of possible programs. The concept of Darwinian evolution may lead us to
assume that whatever the processes are that give rise to the forms we see in
biological systems, they must have been fully shaped by natural selection.
But there is strong evidence (e.g. Ref. [20]) that nature samples programs,
that in some way nature may be disposing what computation proposes. If
the same question about pattern production is now asked in the context
of computation, the probability of chemicals self-assembling to produce the
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digits of pi by chance is substantially larger, because one needs to find a
program producing pi rather than the digits themselves. Programs producing
pi are infinitely shorter than the number of digits in pi.
Patterns in nature could also be the result of a similar way of shortcutting
pattern formation, and the cause of the structure we see in nature. Patterns
would not repeat by mimicking themselves; they would recur because they
are the result of a simple program producing the same pattern over and over,
with the frequency dictated by algorithmic probability. Should the pattern
change, it would mean that the rule has changed too, but as algorithmic
probability predicts, if the program remains short, the chances of its produc-
ing a pattern of low algorithmic complexity, perhaps even the same one that
it was producing before a mutation, is exponentially large, as compared to
the chances of its producing random-looking patterns. It would make better
sense then to think of natural selection as taking place at the level of pro-
grams, in order to preserve the fundamental property of resilience in living
structures, i.e., robustness. Patterns are robust then because they are the
result of a short, concise rule.
On the other hand, if one were free to select random patterns rather than
random programs, the result would be rather random-looking. Yet this seems
not to be what happens, which is why we don’t see sudden changes in patterns
in nature, even if we do experience some apparent randomness. A legitimate
question to ask is the role of this apparent randomness in biology, whether
it is what drives biological speciation based on mutation. Is this randomness
only apparent? Ultimately, is the world more random than structured (see,
e.g. Calude. Another proponent of this view is McAllister [15]).
How could the world be a simple computer program? If every physical
process is itself computable, Turing showed that there is a single machine
capable of running all of them. In other words, one can build a single program
out of many. Of course, claiming that processes or that the world itself
may be a computer program doesn’t mean that they actually are, or that
they behave like Turing machines. We should not let ourselves be fooled
into thinking that the proposition that nature is computable means that the
universe is a Turing machine. Obviously there are natural processes that are
definitely not like Turing machines. A Turing machine is an oversimplification
of the concept of (digital) computation. The human brain, for example, is
a very different object to a Turing machine, despite the parallels between
them. The question of whether (all) physical processes in the human brain
can be carried out by a Turing machine shouldn’t be taken as suggesting that
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the brain is a Turing machine. In A Computable Universe [26], Szudzik and
Hutter provide precise mathematical formalisms for the computable universe
hypothesis.
But if the world is dominated by computable processes, of the kind that
can be carried out by digital computation, then much of the structure of the
world may be credited to computation alone, because computation would
follow the universal distribution of the frequency of patterns that algorith-
mic probability describes. The fact that, their limitations notwithstanding,
scientific models can describe much of the world, and that such models are
computable, strongly suggests that though nature may do more than com-
pute, to a large extent its activity does amount to (Turing) computation. In
the course of history we have managed to make nature do what we wanted it
to do. The process began with simple tools, ultimately leading to computers
that can be programmed to perform all kinds of calculations for us, and used
to make other devices do all kinds of work, serving as tools. If nature does
more than just compute, we know that it nevertheless can compute, and that
it does so very well. One argument that may be advanced against this view
is the inability of scientific models to predict with arbitrary precision. But
their non-linearity by no means implies indeterminism or uncomputability.
As Wolfram has shown, even the simplest computer programs (such as the
elementary cellular automaton (ECA) rule 30) are very difficult, if not im-
possible to understand well enough to be able to predict the manner of their
unfolding–despite its overwhelming simplicity.
We don’t have many reasons, perhaps none at all, to believe that there
is anything inherent in nature that is not Turing computable, even if un-
predictable. The fact that we are always able to replace theories with more
encompassing and more accurate ones can be taken as a computable process
in itself, in the sense of Turing’s very definition of computability. Using pi
again, pi is a computable number because a Turing machine can compute any
arbitrary number of the digital expansion of pi. So even if we are not able to
exhibit and calculate the full expansion of pi in any base, the fact that it is
computable means that we can always provide a better approximation of it.
For any digit with index i in the expansion of pi we can always calculate i+1
digits of pi. pi is also random-looking and in many respects unpredictable, as
we cannot tell, without making a calculation, what an arbitrary digit will be
(not even what the chances are, as it is believed to be normal, every digit
has equal probability). Even if there are formulae (BBP [2]) to calculate
arbitrary digits of pi in bases 2n that do not require the calculation of the
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previous digits, the result of the calculation of a digit of pi doesn’t make it
any easier to recognise. The digits of pi in all the bases in which it has been
studied looks random by all current statistical tests, and although there is no
proof of its normality, it is believed to be so, meaning that it has a property
of a true random number, viz. that it contains every possible pattern, though
it is not itself a pattern, being random.
As for unknown formulae for pi, for ECA rule 30, one cannot rule out
the possibility of formulae of the same or completely different type that
nonetheless permit rapid computation of individual digits of the evolution of
these apparent random systems.
3 Determinism from Quantum Mechanics?
Unlike the apparent randomness from previous section from pi or ECA rule
30, in quantum mechanics events seem to happen for no apparent reason—for
example, the time at which a particle decays or the position of an electron
collapsing from entanglement. Surprisingly enough, the most serious idea
that the universe is digital comes from quantum mechanics (with its roots in a
long tradition beginning with the ancient Greek concept of atomism). It was
Max Plank, who had been trying to understand the emission of radiation from
heated objects, who discovered the quantisation phenomenon of radiation.
Quantum mechanics is in effect thought of as being digital, but it is at the
same time analogue. An electron can be in many places simultaneously,
covering an extended region of space. So quantum mechanics hasn’t settled
the issue once and for all, because particles themselves behave as waves, thus
preserving a duality between digital and analogue descriptions of the most
fundamental building blocks of the universe (for a discussion of this topic see
Ref. [23]). This is not a question of philosophy, nor even of mathematics; it
is a question of physics, with a definite answer. If we zoomed in far enough
into reality, and if the world is digital, we should be able to see pixels and
bits. However, if the world is not digital, we would always be able to zoom
in without being able to prove or disprove any possibility. A third answer is
that it is neither one nor the other, implying that it is actually both, just as
the standard interpretation of quantum mechanics would have it.
There is a tendency, however, that has favoured a discretisation of models
(for some discussion of this matter see Ref. [25]. Electricity was first thought
to be continuous, but then the electron was discovered. Likewise with the
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photon, and gravitation is today approached in the same way. It would seem
that we keep going from a continuous theory to an atomic one, ending up
with an unsatisfactory answer (particle duality leading to an explanation of
electricity in terms of electrons, which themselves behave both as particles
and waves). In this process, we have come to realise that information plays
an important role, as what many of these theoretical mergers actually do
to objects or phenomena is to divest them of certain characteristics once
believed to be exclusively theirs and attribute them to the composite object
or phenomenon of which they are now thought to form a part.
The development of quantum mechanics early in the last century
prompted physicists to radically rethink the concepts they used to describe
the world. No current account of what information may be can be considered
complete that does not take into account the interpretations of quantum me-
chanics. Classical systems comply with the criteria of what may be identified
as local-realism, that is, that the results of measurements of a system localised
in space-time are fully determined by properties inherent in that system (its
physical reality), and cannot be instantaneously influenced by a distant event
(locality). In other words, locality prohibits any influences between events
in space-like separated regions, while realism claims that all measurement
outcomes depend on pre-existing properties of objects that are independent
of measurement. Quantum phenomena, however, seem fundamentally non-
local in the relativistic sense, as one is forced to invoke a particular frame
of reference to give a sense to the statement that measurement of a particle
happens first, and that its result immediately affects the state of a second
particle, even if placed beyond the limit allowed for information exchange
between the two by the theory of relativity.
As discovered by Albert Einstein, Boris Podolsky and Nathan Rosen,
quantum mechanics predicts strong correlations between measurements car-
ried out on two particles in an entangled state. It is tempting to interpret
these correlations as the result of shared properties determined at the time of
their initial interaction and then assimilated into each particle. Bell’s formu-
lation of an inequality [5] made it possible to settle the debate by performing
an experiment to test the inequalities by showing that hidden-variables the-
ories based on the joint assumption of locality and realism are at variance
with the statistical predictions of quantum mechanics.
Ever since, physicists have undertaken experiments to test quantum real-
ity. The first of these was John Bell himself, who showed that if one assumed
that particles were correlated, in the sense that measuring the properties of
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one tells you the properties of the other, then there was an inequality which
described the maximum possible correlation in a classical world. Later re-
finements of Bell’s inequality tests have continuously converged, closing both
the locality loophole on the one hand, and the detection loophole on the
other. Therefore quantum foundation scientists think that it is reasonable
to consider the violation of local realism a well established fact.
For the Bell experiment to validate quantum reality, one would need to
design it to cover all possible open ends or loopholes. Could it be that
there were some biases induced by the Bell experiments that resulted in
particles that were more correlated having a greater chance of being the ones
measured? That would explain the violation. Alain Aspect [1] designed
an experiment to test and rule out this possibility. It involved the use of
several detectors measuring a large number of photon pairs in order to obtain
statistically significant results. After several experiments, the community
reached a point where it was convinced that Aspect’s experiments ruled out
the possibility that Bell’s experiment was statistically biased, measuring only
correlated particles. Could it be that this and other experiments are still
fooling us, making us believe that quantum reality behaves in a certain way
when it actually does not?
Aspect helped to rule out the problem of dealing with local bias in the
measurement of correlated particles, but what if something were influencing
the experiment by communicating properties between particles? One way
to rule out this possibility is by ensuring a distance between the correlated
particles, a distance sufficient to guarantee, by the speed of light, that if the
two measurements at the two ends were fast enough, nothing could travel to
communicate anything about one particle to the other. Remember that the
assumption here is that even when the two particles are correlated because
they come from a single source, they could not be correlated beyond what
the Bell inequality establishes, and so if the correlation is greater than that,
it means that there is an eerie entanglement between quantum particles that
leads one of them to know or change its properties once the other has been
measured.
If two of these particles are close enough to communicate with each other,
the violation of Bell’s inequality is easily explained. One should guarantee
that information cannot therefore be disseminated without a physical carrier,
a carrier of matter which cannot travel faster than the speed of light. And
so by placing two particles far enough apart, one can try to rule out this
possibility (again if it is not the case that there is an underlying layer of in-
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formation, a hidden-variables reality storing or communicating the measured
values). The availability of highly efficient sources of entangled particles
(with the emergence of laser technology) has allowed quantum scientists to
perform Aspect experiments with a distance large enough to apparently close
this loophole, preventing particles from communicating with each other with-
out having to assume that they have done so faster than the speed of light,
which general relativity renders out of the question.
This can only work, however, if the settings of the detectors are changed
every time, given that previous experiments may have influenced them or
that one detector may have figured out the settings of the other. For in
order to guarantee the validity of the resulting measurement of correlation,
there must not be any correlated measurements at the outset. Weihs et
al. [19] managed to separate two particles by 400 meters, giving them 1.3
microseconds to switch the detectors’ settings randomly, and the maximum
5 nanoseconds between the measurements guaranteed that, at the speed of
light, no information could possibly be transmitted between the two ends.
Even as some loopholes in tests of quantum mechanics are closed, others
may open up (e.g. collapse locality) and no test has yet encompassed all
loopholes at once. The local-realistic hidden variables theory preferred by
Einstein may not be a viable description of the world, but there are other
loopholes to close, particularly one that is assumed and that ultimately leads
to a circular argument.
It turns out that the aforementioned attempt at closing a loophole as-
sumes the ability to randomly change the settings of the detectors on each
side, by keeping their random generators far enough apart to ensure that
the choice of one random generator does not influence the other. This is a
loophole that no experimental physicist thinks is worth trying to close, be-
cause there is little, if anything, to test. It turns out that all tests of Bell’s
inequality assume that one has the freedom to choose the detectors’ settings
and that such freedom has to be indeterministic for the interpretation of the
results of the experiment to work. But in practice one is obliged to choose
between two options: either to use a pseudo-random generator, which means
that the source of randomness is actually not random but deterministic and
therefore potentially correlated to the other detectors’ settings, or that one is
free to choose from a set of non-commuting operators, i.e. free will and true
(indeterministic) randomness to begin with when preparing the experiment.
If the universe runs deterministically, however, there is nothing to explain
and all quantum strangeness makes immediately sense. This is in agreement
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with what Bell himself acknowledged as a possibility: if quantum mechanics
is completely deterministic, then even the experimenter’s decision to mea-
sure certain components of the spins is entirely pre-determined, so that the
observer could not possibly have decided to measure anything other than
what he does in fact measure. In other words, the correlations would have
a trivial explanation, because it is trivial to think of correlated states at all
levels, given that everything in the universe would indeed be the effect of a
previous state and would therefore simply share a common origin. By anal-
ogy, think of similar sets of chromosomes between siblings. Sharing genes
explains correlations in their eye colour or other features, without having to
introduce other convoluted explanations. That everything in the universe
is determined since the very beginning is of course a strong commitment to
make in order to make sense of quantum experiments, but it is no doubt it
is much simpler by most, if not all means, than current interpretations of
quantum mechanics.
There must be a reason to try to force an interpretation of quantum me-
chanics where the only possible outcome is indeterministic randomness, even
if it means assuming none other than indeterministic randomness. When the
theory of quantum mechanics was launched in the works of Plank, Einstein
and Bohr, it was clear that classical physics could not explain small-scale
phenomena such as the interaction between particles. The theory of quan-
tum mechanics could, but at great cost, since one had to be ready to make
all kinds of concessions to certain phenomena incompatible with classical
physics. For Bohr, these concessions constituted reality at the level of the
quantum world, while Einstein thought the weirdness of quantum mechanics
meant that the theory was incomplete, that in the end it couldn’t possibly be
as incompatible as it was with the familiar reality we inhabit. He was con-
vinced that an yet undiscovered theory of hidden variables would be capable
of explaining some, if not all, of these strange phenomena.
The logical conclusion one can draw from the violation of local
realism is that at least one of its assumptions fails. But one could
consider the breakdown of other assumptions that are implicit in
our reasoning leading to the inequality. These may include a
violation of the limit imposed by relativity theory or a world that
is completely deterministic [5].
This loophole is often said to be avoided by quantum physicists concerned
with quantum reality, who assume that no test of complete determinism can
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be performed. Nevertheless, pseudo-randomness has the obvious particular-
ity that when its generating process is repeated, the result is exactly the
same. If this is the case, then this very same phenomenon would also oc-
cur in quantum mechanics. The difficulty is perhaps that the formalism of
quantum mechanics only gives us probability amplitudes, but what we may
be witnessing in quantum mechanics in the form of unexpected correlations
is simply actually an indication of determinism that we have tried too hard
to explain otherwise.
For if quantum indeterministic randomness is possible, it still remains to
be explained how that randomness may have any impact on classical me-
chanics (one of, if not the most important discrepancy with relativity). For
example, at the quantum scale, what governs particles is time-reversible, and
all physical laws preserve such time-reversal at the quantum level. Yet this
time-reversal has apparently no impact on our macroscopic reality, suggest-
ing that there may be a causal disconnect here. This may also be the case
with quantum randomness, if it exists. It may be that quantum randomness
does not have any impact beyond the quantum scale. Think of entanglement.
Thus far it has been quite difficult to take advantage of quantum superpo-
sition in the classical world, and this may turn out to be an unsurpassable
barrier. For when an entangled particle interacts with the macroscopic world,
its state collapses to a single determined one and the quantum state is lost,
which would appear to unavoidably set classical mechanics apart from quan-
tum mechanics.
Producing random bits in a discrete universe, where all events are the
cause and effect of other events, would actually be very expensive, if not
produced for free by quantum mechanics. For one would need to devise a
way to break the causal network–assuming that this were possible to begin
with–to produce a random bit and yet leave the rest of the causal network
untouched (otherwise we would see nothing but randomness, which is not
the case).
4 From String Theory to Bit String Theory
On the other hand, information is taking on a fundamental character in mod-
ern physics, black holes, string theory, etc. The assumption that information
is essential to explain our physical reality is not alien to modern physics.
Many physicists have arrived at similar conclusions, giving the concept of
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symmetry (which may be seen as information or an abstract mathematical
object) a foundational role, even in predicting the existence of new particles,
for example. And so far this approach has been quite successful in many
areas of physics. It is remarkable how a simple informational description of
some fundamental properties of quantum mechanics fully describes quantum
phenomena. Such descriptions specify how particles interact and how they
are related to each other by symmetries.
According to classical mechanics, randomness is apparent in the macro-
scopic world, but under the standard interpretation of quantum mechanics
things are fundamentally different. The position that the history of the world
is computationally reversible is compatible with the determinism imposed by
classical mechanics. At the quantum scale, however, things seem otherwise.
When one entangles a particle the particle seems to truly and irreversibly
lose track of its previous state, and there is no way, even by reversing all
operations, to recover it. This also happens with radioactive decay, where an
atomic nucleus of an unstable atom loses energy by emitting ionising parti-
cles for which, according to quantum theory, it is impossible to predict the
decay time, decay being equally likely to occur at any given time.
Zeilinger claims that quantum randomness is intrinsically indeterministic,
and that experiments violating Bell’s inequality imply that some properties
do not exist until measured [21]. These claims are, however, based on a par-
ticular interpretation (if not speculation) of quantum mechanics, from which
he leaps to conclusions by relying on various no-go or no-hidden-variables
theorems proposed by people like von Neumann, Bell, Kochen and Specker,
which are supposed to show that quantum randomness is truly indeterminis-
tic. Zeilinger’s position is a form of weak epistemological randomness, as he
claims that one cannot observe less than one bit of information, and what is
not known is then “random”.
My position resonates with the response to Zeilinger in [9]. But although
I share with Daumer et al. the belief that Wheeler did not shed much light
on the issue with his captivating but somehow rather obscure treatment of
information as being related to, or as more fundamental that physics (his
“it from bit” dictum), I do not share their views as regards what’s wrong
with the informational content of quantum mechanics. As they point out,
Wheeler’s remarkable suggestion was that physics is only about information
or that the physical world itself is information.
In the words of J.A. Wheeler himself [18]:
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It is not unreasonable to imagine that information sits at the
core of physics, just as it sits at the core of a computer. It
from bit. Otherwise put, every it—every particle, every field of
force, even the space-time continuum itself—derives its function,
its meaning, its very existence entirely—even if in some contexts
indirectly—from the apparatus-elicited answers to yes-or-no ques-
tions, binary choices, bits.
Wheeler, however, interjects a nuance related to meaning when introduc-
ing the observer (remember Wheeler is also credited with formulating the
anthropic principle). So in Wheeler’s view, meaning is also subjective, which
means that it is not a completely reductionist, trivial view of information
content.
‘It from bit’ symbolizes the idea that every item of the physical
world has at bottom–a very deep bottom, in most instances–an
immaterial source and explanation; that which we call reality
arises in the last analysis from the posing of yes/no questions
and the registering of equipment-evoked responses; in short, that
all things physical are information-theoretic in origin and that
this is a participatory universe.
Wheeler’s most pointed suggestion is that “information” can’t be defined
in terms of “matter” or “energy” and that it may therefore be as or more
fundamental than either “matter” or “energy”, the most basic notions in
physics. But a second reading also introduces the problem of information
content, meaning, and the observer in his participatory universe.
4.1 An algorithmic approach to the problem of fine
tuning
The anthropic principle can now have a plausible interpretation under this
algorithmic approach, providing a (more reasonable) answer to the question
of the apparent fine tuning of the universe, that is, the question of why
the universe looks just right for accommodating everything in it. A single
value changed in the equation would produce a universe where nothing would
be possible, certainly not life. But if the universe is a computer program,
parameters are not only coupled together but there may be many computer
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programs producing the same output, especially an output of low algorithmic
complexity, that is, a structured universe rather than a random looking one–
contra the position taken by Calude et al. in A Computable Universe [26].
The fact that parameters are coupled is also a reflection of a possible ToE,
according to which everything comes into being as a result of a single physical
law. Hence one may inquire into other possible ToEs that model well behaved
universes where things seem just right, as they do in ours. In Wolfram’s
approach, for example, computer universes that are not trivial very quickly
begin to look complicated enough for us to judge whether it obviously is or
isn’t our universe that’s being modelled. This means that there is a threshold
(captured in Wolfram’s Principle of Computational Equivalence) where a
universe may begin to look as if it had been fine tuned to accommodate all
the structure it is capable of, without being at all special. On the contrary,
as it is capable of structure it would have a low algorithmic complexity and
therefore a high algorithmic probability.
Following Wheeler, I think that the next level of unification (along the
lines of the unification of other previously unrelated concepts in science, such
as electricity and magnetism, light and electromagnetism, and energy and
mass, to mention a few) will involve information and physics (and ultimately,
as a consequence, computation and physics).
Landauer wrote in 1996 (Quoted from Leff and Rex, pag. 335 [14]):
Information is not a disembodied abstract entity; it is always tied
to a physical representation. It is represented by an engraving on
a stone tablet, a spin, a charge, a hole in a punched card, a
mark on paper, or some other equivalent. This links the handling
of information to all the possibilities and restrictions of our real
physical world, its laws of physics and its storehouse of available
parts.
Current attempts to unify modern physics, such as string theory and
quantum gravity, depend on information encodings and on how much infor-
mation is needed to describe something. In these models, it is information
that imparts sense to the forces in the universe and to matter itself. In
quantum gravity space and time are not fundamental; it is information that
constitutes the most basic level of physical reality. That is, everything arises
out of information. Relativity had already relegated space and time to this
status, because there is nothing special about either dimension; it is just what
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happens in each that distinguishes space from time. Events taking place in
them have only a subjective meaning, with information playing a fundamen-
tal role. In quantum gravity too, the exchange of information is fundamental.
These theories are believed to introduce a compatibility between quantum
mechanics and general relativity through the concept of information (in par-
ticular, maximum information), connecting energy from quantum theory and
energy from relativity theory, and finally bridging the two.
4.2 Black holes as perfect data compressors
Leo´ Szila´rd [17] and Rudolf Landauer [13] determined how a computer uses
energy when processing information. It turns out that one can see computers
as spending information only when erasing information. One can add or
multiply or subtract bits without consuming or increasing the energy in the
universe, as long as no information is erased in the process. Landauer’s
principle is derived from solid physical principles. Unfortunately, one has
almost always to erase information, for almost everything. Erasing releases
heat, which dissipates in the environment. The conclusion is that erasing is
not a reversible operation. Erasing is not like subtracting or adding because
subtraction and addition are reversible operations, while erasing entails a
loss of local information, the heat released containing the lost information.
The loss of information at the level of quantum mechanics is apparently of a
different nature.
It turns out that black holes play an important role in the informational
view of our world given that the maximum information when bits are matched
to photons is the maximal mass determined by the black hole limit. At first,
black holes were thought to delete information from the universe; whatever
fell into them would irreversibly be destroyed, despite the generalised as-
sumption from thermodynamics that information in the universe is never
destroyed (Bennett [6]). It was later acknowledged, however, that even black
holes may conserve information in the form of a quantum phenomenon oc-
curring at the event horizon by emitting small amounts of thermal radiation
[11] from which the information in whatever fell into the black hole could be
fully recovered, in principle.
In fact, black hole formation can now be determined, in the context of
what has been called the holographic principle [16], given by the number of
bits of information equal to the surface of the black hole divided by four
multiplied by the Planck area (10−66m2). Among several important conse-
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quences is that the maximum information pertaining to a black hole is finite,
and that information pertaining to this physical object can be understood
in terms of the information in two dimensions (its surface), for which reason
the associated principle is called holographic—by analogy with the fact that
the two-dimensional surface of an object contains information regarding its
volume in three dimensions [4]. This black-hole thermodynamics defines the
maximum amount of information that can potentially be stored in a given
finite region of space which has a finite amount of energy. The more infor-
mation a black hole has, the larger its event horizon, and in no smaller place
such information could be contained, as black holes as maximally larger when
reaching the point of singularity. Black holes can be regarded thus as perfect
data compressors.2
Quantum decoherence means that the information an observer has about
the probabilities of the different possible outcomes involves some specific
physical degrees of freedom. But again, the measurement problem is just
that the observer does not know the outcome of a quantum measurement,
and as such quantum measurements appear not to be reversible, because
entangling a particle again and performing the same experiment would lead
to a different result, one that’s discrepant from the previous measurement,
not because it is random in the mathematical (algorithmic) sense, but in the
same sense as we don’t know, and we seem unable to predict the classical
world, not because it is indeterministic, but because it is unpredictable. Even
if there are subtle differences, it all gets down to a problem of epistemological
nature, information at the end.
This goes to show how information may already explain some of the most
fundamental processes in the universe at the edge of our understanding of
the largest and the tiniest, and underscores the pertinence of asking seriously
whether the universe can be fully explained in terms of information and
computation, perhaps even suggesting ways to conciliate general relativity
with quantum mechanics.
2An interesting question in connection to Kolmogorov complexity, given that Kol-
mogorov complexity is uncomputable, is how nature may have achieved a perfect data
compressor, even though its contents and mechanisms may turn out to be inaccessible to
us in practice.
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